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SHOULD SHORT-TERM MENTAL DISTRESS DAMAGES BE
COMPENSABLE? THE AIR CRASH CASE
JOSEPH A. STRUBBE*
INTRODUCTION
Case law governing recovery for the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress had once been viewed by some commentators as be-
ing "in an almost unparalleled state of confusion. .. " That observa-
tion remains valid today. Although a gradual but distinctive trend of
expanding the scope of recovery is discernable, each phase of expan-
sion is accompanied by vigorous debate over its exact parameters. In re
Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 19792 illustrates
the debate and confusion which accompanies a court's adoption of a
new standard of recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
At issue is whether the Illinois Supreme Court's recent abandonment of
the so-called "impact standard ' 3 and adoption of the "zone of danger
standard" 4 will allow recovery for the mental distress allegedly exper-
ienced by passengers of a commercial jet airliner immediately prior to a
fatal crash.5 The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinios held that the effect of the Illinois Court's adoption of the
"zone of danger rule" is to permit recovery for pre-impact suffering and
distress by any plaintiff who can meet the burden of proof.6
This comment will discuss the evolution of and spirit behind the
different standards governing recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, focusing primarily on the "impact" and "zone of dan-
ger" rules, and analyze how the "zone of danger rule" has been broadly
read to allow damages for short-term pre-impact distress in Air Crash.
Finally, the negative implications of the Air Crash holding will be dis-
* B.A. Western Illinois University, 1981; Candidate for J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law, 1985.
1. Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 103 (1959).
2. No. MDL-391 (N.D. 111. Sept. 15, 1983).
3. See section II(B), infra, for discussion of impact rule.
4. See section II(C), infra, for discussion of zone of danger.
5. This comment focuses only on the negligent infliction of emotional distress issue. Also at
issue was whether pain and suffering damages are available in a products liability action. The
court answered in the affirmative. In Re Air Crash Disaster, No. MDL-391, slip op. at 10 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 15, 1983).
6. Id at 2. See section II(C), infra, for discussion of burden of proof for zone of danger.
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Courts have traditionally been reluctant to recognize mental tran-
quility as a legally protected interest.7 As a result, interference with
peace of mind alone was not a basis for recovery in tort. Chief among
courts' many apprehensions towards allowing such a claim were diffi-
culty in measuring damages, opening courts to a flood of litigation, and
the possibility of frivolous claims.8 Only in the past eighty years have
courts begun to deal with these apprehensions and recognize the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress.9 Claims based on mental dis-
tress, however, even if manifested in physical illness or injury, have
been long regarded as inherently suspect by the courts.' 0 To ease this
suspicion, courts developed rules to limit recovery which demand that
certain factors be present in the action. Confusion arises because no
one rule has been followed by all the courts at anytime, and today four
such limiting rules are in use by different courts. I Each rule, to differ-
ent extents, illustrates courts' concerns with adequate proof of the gen-
uineness of the mental suffering alleged and the fear of exposing
defendants to unlimited liability.' 2 Despite these common concerns,
results of an action vary widely depending on which rule the court
applies.
The "Impact Rule"
The "impact rule," which limits recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, anguish, fright, or shock to those cases where the
plaintiff sustained a contemporaneous physical impact or injury, was
first developed in the late nineteenth century.' 3 Advocates of the rule
7. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, § 54, at 327 (4th ed. 1971).
8. Id
9. Id § 12 at 49-50.
10. MINZER, et al DAMAGES in TORT ACTIONS, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, Matthew-Bender (1982).
11. These are the "impact rule," "zone of danger rule," the "Dillon expansion," and the Mas-
sachusetts rule. All will be discussed infra.
12. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Liability to the Bystander-Recent Develop-
ments, 30 MERCER L. REv. 735, 736 (1979).
13. Leading English and American cases were, respectively, Victorian Ry. Comm'rs v. Coul-
tas, 13 App. & Cas. 22 (1888) (Plaintiffs claimed damages for mental anguish after they had been
permitted to cross railroad tracks and, through the gatekeeper's negligence, were almost struck by
the train. The court held there could be no recovery because the train did not strike the plaintiffs
buggy); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) (The plaintiff was alleged to
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believed that an observable physical injury to the plaintiff sufficiently
corroborates the claim of an unobservable mental injury so as to elimi-
nate the danger of opening courts to a flood of fraudulent or exagger-
ated litigation. '
4
Adherence to the "impact rule" demands that recovery for mental
distress be based on a showing that the distress be "related to, and the
direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained."' 5
One justification for the prerequisite of physical impact reflected the
belief in the late nineteenth century that medical science was not ad-
vanced enough to prove or disprove causation between mental distress
and mere fright.' 6  An accompanying physical injury was believed to
lend credence to the claim of distress.'
7
The requisite physical injury, or impact, was soon reduced to noth-
ing more than a technical requirement, however.' 8 Many courts which
at first followed the impact rule abandoned it over the years.19 English
courts rejected the rule in 1901, only thirteen years after accepting it.20
American courts began to follow suit, with most jurisdictions which
have considered the rule since 1929 also abandoning it.2I The rule was
often viewed as erecting artificial and unwanted barriers to recovery for
injuries which could be as serious or devastating as physical injuries.22
Such barriers were seen as inconsistent with the common law premise
have suffered a miscarriage and illness when one of defendants' teams of horses was negligently
managed and almost ran her over. Plaintiff was denied relief because there was no immediate
personal injury and the court refused to compensate fright).
14. PROSSER, § 54 at 327. See also Columbus Fin. Inc. v. Howard, 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 327
N.E.2d 654 (1975).
15. Deutsch v. Schein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980). The court here recognized that the
amount of physical contact which must be shown is minimal, and they found the physical contact
requisite satisfied by exposure to X-rays.
16. MINZER, Vol. 1, Ch. 5.
17. PROSSER, § 54 at 328.
18. Porter v. Delaware, R.R. Co., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in eyes); Interstate
Life & Acc. Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 59, 193 S.E. 458 (Ct. App. 1932) (struck by tossed coin);
Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-op., 107 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1958) (electrical shock which caused
no burns); Deutsch v. Schein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980) (exposure to X-rays); Christy Bros.
Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (Ct. App. 1928) (circus horse evacuates bowels
into plaintiffs lap). See also PROSSER, § 54 at 33 1.
19. MINZER, Vol. 1, Ch. 5.
20. Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (1901). Plaintiff suffered illness & premature birth as
a result of shock when defendant negligently drove a pair-horse van into plaintiff's public house.
In allowing recovery, the court stated, "That fright-where physical injury is directly produced by
it-cannot be a ground of action merely because of the absence of any accompanying impact
appears to me to be a contention both unreasonable and contrary to the weight of authority." Id
at 674.
21. See MINZER, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, § 5.13(1), n. II for summary of jurisdictions abandoning the
impact rule.
22. MINZER, Vol. I, Ch. 5.
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that every substantial wrong should be redressable at law.23
Illinois, however, did not immediately follow these jurisdictions
which abandoned the "impact rule." Adopted there in 1898,24 Illinois
courts continued to insist that recovery for negligently inflicted mental
distress, suffered by either a direct victim or a bystander who witnessed
injury to another, be denied unless accompanied by a contemporane-
ous physical injury to or impact on the plaintiff.25 By 1980, however,
lower Illinois courts also began to question the impact rule which
"seems inequitable and may not reflect sound public policy." 26 The
lower courts, however, held that the issue was for the state supreme
court and so reluctantly retained the impact rule.
27
Finally, in 1983, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the issue in
Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority.28 Recognizing that two other
holdout jurisdictions abandoned the "impact rule" in 1983 alone,29 the
Illinois Supreme Court adopted a new standard for recovery of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress which is commonly called the
"zone of danger rule."30
The "Zone of Danger Rule"
The "zone of danger rule" allows a plaintiff to recover for mental
distress in cases in which the "impact rule" would deny recovery by
avoiding the requirement of contemporaneous physical impact or in-
jury. It permits a plaintiff to recover for mental suffering with resultant
23. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1923). This was one reason given by the
court for abandonment of the "impact rule."
24. Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401 (1898). Plaintiff alleged fright and mental shock causing
serious physical impairment and pain as a result of defendant-landlord entering the premises,
surprising and shocking plaintiff, and acting in a rude and abusive manner towards her. The court
found for defendant, stating that "terror or fright, even if it results in a nervous shock which
constitutes a physical injury, does not create a liability." Id. at 420.
25. Carlinville Nat'l Bank v. Rhoads, 63 I11. App. 3d 502, 380 N.E.2d 63 (1978); Kaiserman v.
Bright, 61 Ill. App. 3d 67, 377 N.E.2d 261 (1978); Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hosp. and Medical
Center, 60 Ill. App. 3d 679, 377 N.E.2d 215 (1978). These cases illustrate Illinois' adherence to the
"impact rule."
26. Cutright v. City Nat'l Bank of Kankakee, 88 Il. App. 3d 742, 410 N.E.2d 1142 (1980).
Plaintiff here was denied recovery for emotional distress resulting from her being stuck in an
elevator for over an hour while water poured in. The court held that Braun did establish the
"impact rule" in Illinois and that plaintiff therefore cannot recover even though mental distress
resulted in psychological treatment.
27. Id
28. 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d I (1983). See text accompanying notes 38-46 for discussion and
facts of Rickey.
29. Id at 553, 457 N.E.2d at 4. Theseare Missouri, which abandoned the "impact rule" in
Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983); and Ohio in Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4
Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
30. 98 Ill. 2d at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5.
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physical injury provided he was within the zone of danger to his physi-
cal well-being at the time he sustained the fright, shock, or mental dis-
tress giving rise to his claim.31 Simply, the "zone of danger rule"
substitutes the requirement of being near the danger for the require-
ment of actual impact with the danger. Put another way, the "zone of
danger rule" liberalizes the forseeability boundaries of the "impact
rule," substituting "reasonable fear of impact" for "actual impact" as a
prerequisite to recovery.
32
The "zone of danger rule" is now adhered to by a majority of ju-
risdictions. 33 Although allowing recovery to much broader range of fact
patterns than the "impact rule," courts using the "zone of danger rule"
require limiting elements in an attempt to prevent frivolous or fraudu-
lent claims. The most common limiting element demands that the
mental distress cause, or be manifested in physical consequences, either
illness or injury.34 This limitation is best defined by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which states:
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of
causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and
it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm
or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emo-
tional disturbance.
35
Like the "impact rule," then, the "zone of danger rule" does not
allow recovery for pure mental distress alone. Some physical injury or
symptom is required. However, the "zone of danger rule" alters the
sequence of events under which recovery may be allowed.36 The "im-
pact rule" demands that physical injury or impact occur prior to or
contemporaneously with the alleged wrong giving rise to mental dis-
tress, while mental distress under the "zone of danger rule" precedes
the physical manifestation and must be the cause of that illness or
injury.3
7
31. MINZER, Vol. 1, Ch. 5. See also Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978);
Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231,
21 A.2d 402 (1941).
32. Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1978). The court here stated that the
focal point of the "zone of danger test" is the forseeability of injury to the plaintiff. Id at 76.
33. MINZER, Vol. 1, Ch.5.
34. Dailey v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552
(Minn. 1980); Fournell v. Usher Pest Control Co., 208 Neb. 684, 385 N.W.2d 605 (1981). These
cases illustrate the physical illness or injury requirement as expressed by courts of different
jurisdictions.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 A at 461 (1965).
36. MINZER, Vol. 1, Ch. 5.
37. Id
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Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authorit"8 provides an excellent illustra-
tion of the difference between the "impact rule" and the "zone of dan-
ger rule." In Rickey, an eight year old witnessed the strangulation of
his five year old brother when the younger boy's clothing became en-
tangled in an escalator.39 The younger boy has since died.40 As a
result of witnessing the accident, the eight year old sustained severe
mental and emotional distress, which became manifest in physical in-
jury, including alleged definite functional, emotional, psychiatric, and
behavioral disorders, extreme depression, prolonged and continued
mental disturbances, inability to attend school and engage in gainful
employment and to engage in his usual and customary affairs. 41 The
Circuit Court of Cook County dismissed the complaint with prejudice,
stating that there is no action of emotional distress caused by another's
negligence without contemporaneous physical impact upon the plain-
tiff.4 2 The "impact rule," then, denies recovery to a bystander plaintiff
who suffers from mental distress but who did not suffer the requisite
physical impact or injury prior to or contemporaneous with the distress
inducing event.
The Illinois Supreme Court, perhaps believing that a legitimate
claim was being denied relief,43 abandoned the "impact rule" and
adopted the "zone of danger test," 44 thereby remanding Rickey to a
lower court for fact finding.45 The court stated that a plaintiff by-
stander, like that in Rickey, could now recover for mental distress
where he is in a zone of physical danger and who, as a result of the
defendant's negligence, feared for his own safety and can show physi-
cal illness or injury as a result of the mental distress.
46
38. 98 Ill.2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983).
39. Id at 549, 457 N.E.2d at 2. The two boys' mother was also present, but no action for
mental distress was brought in her behalf. See Winter, A Tort in Transition.- Negligent Infliction of
Mental Distress, ABA JOURNAL, March 1984, at 62.
40. The younger boy also lost his right arm and left ear as a result of the accident. An action
for his injuries was settled. See Winter, ABA JOURNAL.
41. The action for mental distress of the older brother was brought six years after the acci-
dent. See Winter, ABA JOURNAL.
42. 98 Ill.2d at 459, 457 N.E.2d at 1. The court, in denying the claim for mental distress,
relied on the "impact rule."
43. Id at 554, 457 N.E.2d at 4. The Rickey court stated that the question of recovery for
negligently inflicted emotional distress should not be determined solely on whether there was a
contemporaneous impact upon the plaintiff. A prime consideration against the "impact rule" has
been that legitimate claims with substantial wrongs are barred from the court without an impact.
See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
44. 98 I11. 2d at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5.
45. Id at 556, 457 N.E.2d at 5. The Rickey court allowed plaintiffs to plead again under the
"zone of danger test." The plaintiff must assert the plaintiffs position on the escalator, whether he
was endangered, and whether he feared for his own safety.
46. Id at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5. The court cites cases listed supra note 34.
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Although this first use of the "zone of danger rule" by Illinois
courts involved a plaintiff-bystander, other jurisdictions which follow
the rule have allowed damages for mental distress to the direct victims
of the defendant's negligence. 47 It is on behalf of the victims of a plane
wreck, direct victims of the defendant's negligence, which the mental
distress claim is brought in Air Crash.
Recent Expansions
Although the holding in Air Crash is based upon Illinois' aban-
donment of the "impact rule" in favor of the "zone of danger rule," two
recent developments in the area should be quickly addressed to further
illustrate the diverse rules used by jurisdictions regarding recovery for
mental distress.
In Dillon v. Legg,4 8 the California Supreme Court abandoned the
"zone of danger rule" and allowed a mother who witnessed her child's
death recovery for mental distress, even though she was not within the
zone of danger. 49 Since termed the "Dillon expansion," this rule allows
recovery based on forseeability of the injuries or distress at the time of
the negligent act. 50 Although limiting factors are present, 51 this rule is
considerably more expansive than the "zone of danger test."
In Parsons v. Superior Court,52 a California appellate court reaf-
firmed a limiting factor of Dillon by stressing that a requisite to recov-
ery is the plaintiff's sensory perception of the injury producing accident
or event.53 Several other jurisdictions have made use of the Dillon ex-
47. Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1980) (plaintiff became ill
from mental distress caused by finding a foreign object in a soft drink); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet,
Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 234 A.2d 656 (1967) (dump truck struck plaintiffs house); Battalla v. State, 10
N.Y. 2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961) (plaintiff suffered distress due to fear when defendant failed to
secure a chair lift safety bar); Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959) (truck
struck porch of plaintiffs house).
48. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
49. Id at 731, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75. Plaintiff's infant daughter was struck and
killed by an automobile while she lawfully crossed a road. The plaintiff witnessed the collision,
but did not state that she herself was in the "zone of danger" or feared for her own safety.
50. The court, in allowing distress damages, recognized that in some cases, a plaintiff will not
be in a zone of physical risk, but bodily injury or sickness is caused by the defendant's conduct. In
such cases, the Dillon court stated that, under general principles recovery should be had if defend-
ant should forsee fright or shock severe enough to cause substantial injury in a person normally
constituted. Id at 735, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
51. The court will consider these factors in determining forseeability under the Dillon rule:
(1) whether plaintiff was located near the accident, as contrasted with far away; (2) whether the
plaintiff had sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, contrasted with learning
about it later from a third party; and, (3) the relationship of plaintiff to victim. Id at 735, 441 P.2d
at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
52. 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978).
53. Id In Parsons, plaintiffs (a mother and father), were driving some distance behind the
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pansion since it was formulated by the California Supreme Court. 54
Massachusetts, however, has gone one step further than Dillon. In
Dziokonski v. Babineau" the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
allowed a cause of action for mental distress without the sensory per-
ception of the event required by Dillon.56 Under Dziokonski, the plain-
tiff need not see, hear, or feel the accident in any way, but only must
come upon the scene while the injured party is still there.
57
Although Dillon and its derivatives deal only with negligent inflic-
tion of mental distress to a bystander, while the "impact rule" and
"zone of danger rule" can be applied to the direct victim of a negligent
act, these modem theories illustrate the ever expanding reach of recov-
ery for mental distress. Similarily, Air Crash can be viewed as an ex-
pansion of the "zone of danger rule" by allowing an action for fleeting
emotional distress.
THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION
On May 25, 1979, a McDonnell Douglas DC- 10 jet airliner, oper-
ated by American Airlines as flight 191, crashed into an open field near
O'Hare International Airport approximately thirty one seconds after
takeoff.58 All 258 passengers and 13 crewmembers were killed. 59 Vari-
defendant's auto, in which plaintiffs' two children were riding. Plaintiffs rounded a curve in the
road and came upon the wreckage of defendant's car. The court denied recovery for emotional
distress based on Dillon because there was no showing that plaintiffs saw, heard, or otherwise
sensorily perceived the injury producing event.
54. Rhode Island, see D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 543, 338 A.2d 524 (1975); Hawaii,
see Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Michigan, see Toms v. McConnell, 45
Mich. App. 647, 207 N.w.2d 140 (1973).
55. 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978).
56. Id In Dziokonski administratrix of estates of a husband and wife brought an action
alleging that the deaths of husband and wife were the result of physical injuries caused by emo-
tional distress which was caused by the injuries to the child of the couple. The child was struck by
defendant's school bus. The mother went to the scene of the accident and witnessed her daughter
lying injured on the ground. The mother died while riding with the child in an ambulance, alleg-
edly the result of physical and emotional shock brought about by the injuries to her daughter.
The father, upon learning of the death of his wife and injury to his daughter, also died, allegedly
from an aggravated ulcer, coronary occlusion, and emotional shock. The court held that the ac-
tion was valid.
57. Id The court, in formulating a rule for recovery, stated that they should not adopt a rule
which absolutely denies recovery to every parent for negligently caused emotional injuries result-
ing from concern over safety or injury of his child. The court concluded that a parent suffering
physical harm as a result of severe mental distress over peril or harm to his minor child caused by
defendant's negligence states a valid action where the parent either witnesses the accident, (this is
Dillon rule) or soon comes upon the scene while the child is still there.
58. Kennelly, Litigation Implication of the Chicago O'Hare Airport Crash ofAmerican Airlines
Flight 191, 15 J. MAR. 273 (1982).
59. ld
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ous wrongful death and survival actions were filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
On November 4, 1980, the court, applying Illinois law, granted in
part a motion of the defendants which precluded a plaintiffs claim for
damages for emotional distress and suffering experienced prior to the
impact of the crash.60 The court, summarizing the "impact rule" estab-
lished in Illinois by Braun v. Craven,6t stated that in Illinois an individ-
ual can recover for emotional distress or suffering only where that
distress is caused by a physical injury, or impact. 62 The court went on
to reason that the "impact rule" precludes recovery for the fright and
terror experienced by the passengers during the final "roll" of the jet
towards the ground simply because that distress occurred prior to the
impact and was not caused by the impact itself.
63
The plaintiff, reiterating an argument accepted by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Solomon v. Warren,64 contended that
the time for recovery for emotional distress should be extended to in-
clude the period immediately prior to an inevitable physical injury.
65
The court rejected this argument and held, based in part on the dissent
in Solomon, that the effect of the "impact rule" is to impose an absolute
caustion requirement which limits recovery for mental distress to that
resulting from the impact of the crash.
66
However, on June 17, 1983, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Rickey
v. Chicago TransitAuthority,67 abandoned the "impact rule" in favor of
the "zone of danger rule" and declared "the standard we adopt here
shall be applied to this case and all cases not finally adjudicated. ' 68 In
light of Rickey, the plaintiffs of Air Crash moved for a reconsideration
of the court's earlier refusal to allow claims for pre-impact distress. 69
The court held that the effect of the Rickey court's adoption of the
60. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois On May 25, 1979, 507 F. Supp. 21 (N.D.
Ill. 1980). Specifically, the court was presented the issue in the case of DeYoung v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp.
61. See supra note 24.
62. 507 F. Supp. at 23.
63. Id.
64. 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1977). A light plane was lost at sea. The court allowed the jury to
award distress damages for the few seconds prior to the crash.
65. 507 F. Supp. at 23. Plaintiff argues to remove the impact requirement from the "impact
rule."
66. Id at 24.
67. 98 I1.2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 38-46 for summary
of Rickey.
68. Id at 556, 457 N.E.2d at 5.
69. In re Air Crash, No. MDL-391, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1983). Because the earlier
refusal to allow the claims was based on the use of the "impact rule" in Illinois, it follows that a
new standard may provide a different result.
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"zone of danger rule" is to permit recovery in Illinois for pre-impact
distress by any plaintiff who can show the requisite resultant physical
manifestations. 70 The court then granted plaintiffs leave to amend
their complaints.
7'
The Air Crash court, in reconsidering the issue of pre-impact dis-
tress damages, began by summarizing its earlier holding which was
based on the use of the "impact rule" by Illinois. The court then
turned to Rickey, stating that, although very different on its facts, the
adoption of the "zone of danger rule" there "squarely rejects the major
premise of our November 4, 1980 decision: that an Illinois court would
not allow damages for a plaintiffs fear or apprehension of danger.
'72
The Air Crash court went on to recognize that Rickey did not create a
broad tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress along the lines of
Dillon v. Legg,7 3 but instead allowed recovery for distress in Illinois to
be governed by the "zone of danger rule."' 74 The Air Crash court
pointed out that in Rickey, the "zone of danger rule" was applied
where a plaintiff-bystander witnesses the injury of another, but then
stated that the defendants were correct in conceding that the rule will
also apply where a plaintiff who is in a "zone of danger" subsequently
becomes a direct victim himself.
75
The court identified two main contentions of the defendants: first,
that as a matter of law no plaintiff could show that a passenger aboard
the jet suffered "resultant physical manifestations"; and second, that
the interval of pre-impact distress before the passengers' deaths is too
short as a matter of law to allow recovery for any emotional suffering
of the decedents. 76 Defendants' claims, as summarized by the court, is





72. Id at 3.
73. See supra § II(D) for Dillon discussion.
74. Slip op. at 5. The Air Crash court states that the Illinois Supreme Court (in Rickey)
refused to create a broad tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress of the type in Dillon. The
Rickey court found Dillon to be "a standard that is too vaguely defined to serve as a yardstick for
courts to apply, and one that is excessively broad in that it would permit recovery for emotional
disturbance alone." 98 Ill.2d at 554, 457 N.E.2d at 4.
75. Slip op. at 5.
76. Id at 6, 7.
77. Id See also Memorandum of Defendant McDonnell Douglas Corporation in Opposition
to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order of November 4, 1980 at 6, Air
Crash. Defendant states that plaintiffs' legal arguments and general statements as to what they
intend to prove do not suggest a sufficient probability of injury or illness so as to avoid Illinois'
prohibition against "speculative" damages.
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Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contended that the requirement of
Rickey, that physical manifestations resulting from the distress be
shown, does not apply when there is direct physical injury to the
plaintiff.
78
The Air Crash court found that neither position is persuasive.
79
The court held that the short duration of distress does not make that
distress totally non-compensable, and that the plaintiffs must separately
plead and prove pre-impact distress and resultant physical manifesta-
tions.80 Finally, the court held that should a plaintiff be able to prove
physical manifestations of distress prior to impact, 8' through the use of
expert witnesses, that plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for pre-
impact distress under current Illinois law.
82
ANALYSIS
The plaintiffs' actions to recover pre-impact emotional distress
damages on behalf of their decedents presented the Air Crash court
with a problem. Rickey is the only applicable Illinois case, and, in the
words of the Air Crash court, is "very different on its facts." 83 Never-
theless, the court stated that Rickey squarely rejects the major premise
of its earlier opinion which denied a cause of action of mental distress
based on the "impact rule,"' 84 and concluded that under Rickey's "zone
of danger rule" an action for short-term pre-impact distress is now
valid.85
In so holding, the Air Crash court is reading Rickey far too
broadly. Rickey dealt with severe, prolonged emotional distress to a
bystander, not the fleeting distress of a direct victim as does Air Crash.
Other "zone of danger" jurisdictions have allowed actions for the
mental distress of a direct victim, 86 and the Air Crash plaintiff's brief
78. Slip op. at 6, 7. See also Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsidera-
tion of this Court's Order of November 4, 1980, and for leave to Amend, Air Crash.
79. Slip op. at 7.
80. Id at 7, 8.
81. Id. at 9. See infra text accompanying note 103 for a list of what plaintiffs intend to offer
as evidence of physical manifestations of distress.
82. Slip op. at 9. The court also holds that damages for pain and suffering are recoverable
under a products liability action, and that emotional distress and physical manifestations are both
compensable. This comment limits itself to the emotional distress issue, however.
83. Slip op. at 3.
84. Id See supra text accompanying notes 60-66.
85. Slip op. at 9.
86. See supra note 47. Allowing an action for mental distress under the "zone of danger rule"
to a direct victim is generally accepted as proper. Because a plaintiff in a zone of danger can bring
an action, it would not be logical to bar the action solely because the plaintiff suffers a direct
impact.
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points to several of these cases to support the proposition that Illinois
law would allow recovery for pre-impact distress.8 7 These cases can be
distinguished from Air Crash, however. In each, the direct victim was
allowed recovery under the "zone of danger rule" for substantial, pro-
longed mental distress. 88 In Air Crash, though, any mental distress suf-
fered by the direct victims lasted no more than thirty seconds,8 9 when
their death obviously ended all mental suffering.
The defendants in Air Crash concede that Illinois law would now
allow recovery to a direct victim. 90 The defendants suggest, however,
that Rickey's "zone of danger rule" allows recovery only in those cases
where prolonged emotional suffering follows the incident.9 1 The Air
Crash court rejected this contention and found that the "zone of danger
rule," as stated in Rickey, would allow damages for distress of a very
short duration. The Rickey court, however, makes no such sweeping
statement of the law in allowing a claim there for very severe, pro-
longed emotional distress. 92
By allowing claims for fleeting mental distress, the Air Crash court
greatly expands recovery under the "zone of danger rule." This expan-
sion finds very little support in precedent. Although a few jurisdictions
have allowed recovery for distress followed almost immediately by
death, such awards are the exception and not the rule and furthermore
can be distinguished from Air Crash. In Kozar v. Chesapeake and Ohio
Railway Company,93 for example, recovery for fleeting mental distress
was allowed under the Federal Employees' Liability Act,94 not the
common law tort theory of recovery dealt with in Air Crash. In Solo-
mon v. Warren,95 recovery for fleeting mental distress was allowed
under the "impact rule," not the "zone of danger rule" dealt with by
Air Crash. Furthermore, the Air Crash court expressly rejected the rea-
87. See Plaintiffs Memorandum at 8, Air Crash.
88. See supra note 47.
89. See slip op. at 6. The court has accepted as fact that Flight 191 was airborn no more than
thirty one seconds.
90. See Defendant's Memorandum at 3, Air Crash.
91. Id. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
92. 98 1l.2d at 549, 550, 457 N.E.2d at 2.
93. 320 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Mich. 1970), afrd 449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971) (plaintiffs dece-
dent killed when box car fell on him, jury awards $500 damages for emotional fright and suffering
endured between the time decedent first realized car was falling and time he was struck and
killed).
94. 5 U.S.C. § 6301 et. seq. (1976). The court in Kozar allowed the fleeting distress damages
because the Supreme Court in Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957) stated that the
Act is not to be eroded by narrow and niggardly construction.
95. See supra note 64.
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soning of the Solomon court.96
Although fault cannot usually be found with the principle that the
short duration of compensable damages is relevant only to the amount
of the award granted, inherent in the short duration of mental distress
is the inability to prove physical injury, which renders that distress
non-compensable. As stated previously, recovery under the "zone of
danger" rule is allowed only upon a showing that the plaintiff's distress
was manifested in physical illness or injury.97 The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts states that there is no liability for "transitory, non-recur-
ring physical phenomena."98 In adopting the "zone of danger rule,"
the Rickey court stressed the need for proof of concrete physical injury
or manifestations of distress in order to recover. Where the distress
lasts only thirty-one seconds, however, it is inconceivable that anything
beyond transitory, non-recurring physical phenomena can be proven.
Therefore, distress of such short duration is not compensable under the
"zone of danger rule."
In the first Illinois case to go to trial on the issue of pre-impact
distress under the Air Crash holding, the jury found that the plaintiff
had failed to prove the requisite physical injury and so denied recov-
ery.99 An expert for the defense testified that thirty-one seconds of dis-
tress is too short a time period for physical injuries to occur.' ° °
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had earlier agreed by
striking down a jury award for pre-impact distress in Shalkin v. Mc-
Donnell Douglas. 10t The action there arose out of the same disaster as
the claims before the Air Crash court. The Shatkin court found that no
evidence on record supported the contention that the decedant suffered
prior to the impact which instantly killed all those on board. 0 2 The
court found that flight 191 maintained a normal flight path, despite the
96. See supra text accompanying notes 64, 66.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 34, 35.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment c (1977).
99. Moruzi v. McDonnell Douglas, No. 79 C 4805. No. MDL-391 (N.D. I1l. 1979). The case
went to trial on September 17, 1984. It is important to note that the Moruzi case was selected by
counsel for both sides as the important first case to try the issue of pre-impact distress in Illinois.
100. Dr. John C. Duffy testified for the plaintiff that everyone aboard the jet was obviously
terrified during the final seconds of flight. Illinois law, however, does not compensate for terror
alone. See supra text accompanying notes 35, 36.
101. Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas, Nos. 83-7674, 83-7680, 83-7698 (2nd Cir. Jan. 26, 1984).
102. Id. Because courts will rule on the evidence before ruling on the validity of the nature of
the claim itself, it is forseeable that, because of the Air Crash holding allowing pre-impact distress
claims, defendants there will be forced to continuously challenge the evidence on such claims. In
light of Shatkin, these challenges will be successful, but expensive for defendant and time consum-
ing for the courts. The policy issue may never be reached.
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loss of an engine, until only three seconds before it crashed. 10 3 The
Shatkin court ruled that, on these facts, any pre-impact distress would
be speculative.' °4 The second circuit, however, later allowed recovery
for a pre-impact distress claim arising out of the crash of flight 191 in
Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas.10 5 The court distinguished its
holding here with the Shatkin outcome weakly, finding that because the
decedent in Shu-Tao Lin was seated on the left side of the plane, he
may have seen the engine fall off.'0 6 Because there can be no evidence
showing that the decedent was looking out his window, was awake, or
was in the correct seat, the finding of pre-impact distress here is also
speculative and should be struck down.
Although the Air Crash court, in allowing claims for pre-impact
distress, did not have the benefit of prior flight 191 trial results, it did
recognize the Rickey court's concern with speculative damages and the
need for concrete physical manifestations of distress requisite to recov-
ery under the "zone of danger rule." The Air Crash court nevertheless
accepted the plaintiffs contention that the requirements of Rickey can
be met by showing "increased heart rate, sweating, pupil dilation, blad-
der and bowel incontinence, muscular tremors, increased respiration,
restriction of coronary arteries," and hyperirritiability of the nervous
system prior to death.'0 7 Such symptoms, however, appear to be of the
type of minor physical manifestations that the Rickey court sought to
restrict with its emphasis on the illness or injury requirement. The
findings of the Shatkin court further illustrate that the Rickey court's
concern with speculative damages has been violated by the Air Crash
holding. Illinois took almost one hundred years to abandon the "im-
pact rule," under which recovery to Air Crash plaintiffs would be de-
nied, and adopt the "zone of danger rule."' 1 8 Despite the obvious
reluctance of Illinois courts' to expand recovery for mental distress, Air
Crash reads Rickey as expanding such recovery to the widest possible
extremes under the "zone of danger rule." That rule was adopted in
Rickey to allow an action for very real, prolonged, and serious emo-
tional injury. 10 9 It is inconceivable that the Rickey court intended to
103. Id. The court relied on the findings of the National Transportation Safety Board, which
found that the plane did not go into its 90 degree plunge until 3 seconds before impact.
104. Id
105. Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Doulgas, Nos. 83-7909, 83-7933 (2nd Cir. July 30, 1984).
106. Id
107. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, note 2 on 12, Air Crash.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 24-30.
109. Id
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allow recovery for emotional distress of so short a duration as that in
Air Crash.
An analogy may help illustrate that the Rickey court would not
allow recovery for emotional distress in Air Crash. In Holton v.
Daly," 0 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a wrongful death action
was the exclusive remedy where death resulted from tortious conduct.
Almost one hundred years later, in Murphy v. Martin Oil Co.,", the
court held that damages for conscious pain and suffering prior to death
could be recovered as well. In Murphy, plaintiffs decedent was burned
in an explosion and died nine days later." 12 In abandoning almost one
hundred years of precedent, the Murphy court stated that "prolonged
pain and suffering" should be actionable even where death results.,"
3
The court undoubtably recognized that nine days of suffering should be
compensable.
Likewise, the Rickey court, in abandoning almost one hundred
years of precedent, seemed to stress that the prolonged and serious na-
ture of the plaintiffs emotional suffering should be compensable at law.
The Illinois Supreme Court, then, has consistently considered the dura-
tion of suffering, whether physical or mental, in allowing claims. The
extremely short duration of distress in Air Crash seems very unlikely to
receive the Illinois Supreme Court's blessing as being compensable.
Most likely, the supreme court would consider claims for such damages
frivolous and speculative, which they hoped to bar from the court. 1 4
Taken in a broader perspective, the Air Crash result may violate
the spirit behind the entire tort of negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. As stated previously, interference with peace of mind tradition-
ally was not recognized as a basis for recovery in tort.' ' 5 Once
recognized as a basis for recovery, courts eased their fears of fictitious
or speculative claims by erecting barriers to limit recovery. 116 A major
criticism which eventually led courts to adopt less prohibitive rules was
based on the fundamental premise of the common law system that one
should have redress for every substantial wrong which inflicts injury
upon his or her person.' ' 7 This premise can be viewed as the basis for
allowing recovery for mental distress.
110. 106 Ill. 131 (1882).
111. 56 I11.2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1978).
112. Id. at 425, 308 N.E.2d at 584.
113. Id at 431, 308 N.E.2d at 587.
114. 98 I11.2d at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5.
115. See supra text accompanying note 7.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
117. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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The Air Crash holding, however, may go beyond this common law
principle of justice. There can be no doubt that severe, prolonged
mental distress is a substantial wrong which should be redressable at
law. Distress lasting less than thirty seconds, however, and ending for-
ever with the death of the distressed, seems hardly substantial. By al-
lowing recovery for such short-term distress, the Air Crash court has
brought the tort of emotional distress further than the common law
principle which justifies that tort's very existence.
Furthermore, the Air Crash defendant's wrong will not escape re-
dress should the distress claims be barred. Wrongful death actions
have been filed, and the parties have entered a "no contest" stipulation
as to the defendant's liability." 8 The plaintiffs, then, have a guaran-
teed remedy for the defendant's wrong. These plaintiffs, however, are
not content, and in light of the Air Crash holding, can now tack on
more claims for the same wrong. Because plaintiffs already have re-
dress for the defendant's wrong, and because thirty seconds, at most, of
mental distress is insubstantial, pre-impact distress claims are frivolous.
The Air Crash court has allowed the long standing apprehension of
frivolous and speculative claims for mental distress, as expressed by the
Rickey court,' 19 to become reality.
In allowing pre-impact distress claims, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois appears to have found a new
train of thought. This same court flatly denied such claims under the
prior Illinois standard of the "impact rule,"' 120 but easily could have
allowed them there. In the few moments prior to the crash, the air-
craft's wing reached right angle to the ground, and with 258 of the 264
seats occupied, passengers were knocked against each other and the
cabin walls while loose or unsecured objects in the cabin became dan-
gerous missles. As previously stated, the requirement of physical im-
pact under the "impact rule" had been reduced to a mere technical
requirement.' 2' Surely the activity within the aircraft's cabin prior to
crash would satisfy this mere technical requirement of impact. The Air
Crash court, however, saw fit to bar pre-impact distress claims under
the "impact rule" only to read Rickey so broadly as to allow these
claims under the "zone of danger rule."
It cannot be denied that Rickey can be construed to allow pre-
impact distress claims, but such a reading ignores the spirit and intent
118. Seeslip op.
119. 98 1l1.2d at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5.
120. 507 F. Supp. at 23 (first opinion).
12 1. See supra note 18.
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of both Rickey and the "zone of danger rule." Furthermore, the impact
of the Air Crash holding presents a rather bleak outlook. It is conceiva-
ble that, under the authority of Air Crash, courts will be faced with a
flood of emotional distress claims coupled with traditional wrongful
death cases. Because the Air Crash court refused to consider the fleet-
ing duration of the distress as a limit to recovery, 22 the estate of any
wrongful death victim who was aware of the impending accident for
any length of time will have an opportunity to recover for mental dis-
tress. The Air Crash court has diluted the physical manifestation re-
quirement as set forth by the Rickey court to allow speculative claims.
The prospect of a never ending train of expert witnesses is discouraging
to an already overburdened court system.
CONCLUSION
The Illinois Supreme Court in Rickey was faced with prolonged
mental suffering. The test they adopted to allow a claim for distress
there has been interpreted by the Air Crash court to allow actions for
mental distress of extremely short duration. The Illinois Supreme
Court must fine tune their Rickey holding to prevent a rash of actions
based on fleeting mental distress. Although worded narrowly, their
Rickey opinion has been read as paving the way for frivolous and spec-
ulative emotional distress actions. The Illinois Supreme Court must
reiterate their adoption of the "zone of danger test," and in so doing
limit mental distress actions to those involving prolonged suffering. By
doing this, some of the confusion permeating the tort of negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress in Illinois can be eliminated.
122. Slip op. at 7.

